

# VOTERGA.ORG FACT CHECK
















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False Statements - 4

Mostly False - 6

"Pants on Fire" - 5

| Rating  | <u><a href="#">"Setting The Election Record Straight"</a></u>   | <u>ACTUAL VOTERGA FACTS</u>   |
|---|---|---|
|    | "Georgia's election system is secure"   | Ha! <a href="#">Numerous experts</a> have provided court testimony and letters to government officials confirming it is not secure  |
|    | "...it has been subject to repeated audits..."  | The voting system had only one audit every 2 years <a href="#">by law</a>   |
|    | "... and [the system has] come through with flying colors.."  | The voting system <a href="#">declared wrong winners</a> for DeKalb District 2 Commission which was the only 2022 primary race that was fully audited   |
|    | "The 'critics of Georgia's election security' ... are from one of only two groups: election-denying conspiracy theorists or litigants..."   | Critics include <a href="#">cybersecurity experts and science professors</a> throughout the country. The demeaning terms used by the author are intentionally designed to deceive the reader  |
|    | "These two groups make ever-shifting but always baseless assertions that Georgia's election system is at risk ..."  | Assertions were confirmed by <a href="#">Senate Judiciary</a> and House Government Affairs Committees, county election boards and <a href="#">Governor Kemp's 36-point study</a> for the State Election Board                       |
|    | "We ... conducted a risk-limiting audit and a full hand recount of every ballot in Georgia to prove that our results were accurate...."   | <a href="#">VoterGA determined</a> the Fulton Co. full hand recount had a 60% batch error rate, falsified tally sheets, 300+ duplicate scanned ballots and 4,000+ duplicate reported ballots  |
|   | "The 2022 elections saw ... virtually zero complaints about the process -or the results"  | In 2022, a candidate was <a href="#">found to have gotten no votes</a> in the precinct where she and her husband lived and voted  |
|  | "That system, proven and tested, is the system we have in place today for Georgia elections."   | The system has been tested but has not been proven to always count accurately   |
|  | "We have layers of security protocols and procedures to physically protect ballots, the system, the software, and the results."   | Security protocols and procedures do not include ballot inspections and are inadequate to protect voters against counterfeit ballots and incorrect results  |
|  | "We have tests and audits to verify results."   | Tests cannot verify results because they are run before the results are produced  |
|  | "It identified risks that are theoretical and imaginary."   | The <a href="#">Halderman Security Analysis</a> identified risks that are real, not imaginary   |
|  | "The MITRE report ... points out that the vulnerabilities described by Halderman as operationally infeasible."  | <a href="#">The MITRE report</a> was funded by Dominion, produced without access to a voting system and assumes perfect procedural defenses, <a href="#">called "ridiculous" by 29 experts</a>                                      |
|  | "One attack was technically scalable but also...infeasible due to access controls in place..."  | Counties have no access controls to detect malware attacks when received in election definition files as the <a href="#">Halderman Security Analysis</a> points out   |
|  | "Is it possible for a team of bad actors to break into Georgia's 2700 voting precincts, install malware...It's more likely that I could win the lottery without buying a ticket." | <a href="#">Halderman explains</a> no break in is needed when the state system can currently distribute election definition malware to all counties. That malware can then spread to each scanner and touchscreen without detection |
|  | "I believe that legislative consideration for increasing the penalties ... would demonstrate to the people of Georgia that we take their elections seriously."                    | Making ballots public record to detect counterfeits and verify election results would tell the people of Georgia that they take elections seriously   |