



March 10, 2026

Dear County Election Directors,

The Georgia Association of Voter Registration and Election Officials (GAVREO) is currently **opposing all legislative attempts to secure our 2026 elections**. Specifically, they oppose the House Elections Study Committee [recommendation](#) to bypass the illegal, unverifiable Quick Response (QR) code on our current Ballot Marking Devices (BMD) by hand counting early voting results for 2026 elections. GAVREO also opposes the [Senate Bill 568](#) alternative for 2026 that offers all of these election security improvements:

1. Hand-marked paper ballots that eliminate unverifiable Quick Response (QR) code votes;
2. Comprehensive audits to help detect vote count errors;
3. True recounts in close races to help ensure election results are correct;
4. Ballot batch identifiers to help detect unauthorized duplication of ballots;
5. Activation of infrared capabilities to help detect counterfeit ballots;
6. Timely availability of voter lists for reconciliation accuracy;
7. Better enforcement of voter roll clean-up laws.

I am requesting a reply to confirm that you agree with GAVREO's oppositions in light of the security issues listed in this letter and if so, **please include your proposed solutions to secure the 2026 elections**.

I am a career Information Technology professional with 25 years of election integrity advocacy and 13 years of **cyber protection** for internet based financial transactions. In 2006, I co-founded *Voters Organized for Trusted Election Results in Georgia* and have testified as an expert witness in Georgia and national cases. We recently produced our [Georgia Voting Systems Security Recommendations](#) for the House committee. I urge you to read the **current voting system vulnerabilities** referenced as pages in the subsequent bullet points.

We believe GAVREO opposition to current proposed House and Senate security measures threatens to create a **statewide election security crisis** that I want to make sure you understand. Unrefuted expert witness testimony, legal discovery and the only forensic exam of an authenticated county election server have documented numerous security issues in our current Dominion Democracy Suite (DDS) 5.5A system that must be immediately addressed and cannot be fixed with a software patch. Examples are:

Vote Count Failures

1. **Georgia's system declared wrong winners** in a 2022 DeKalb Commission primary where a **75% count error** was discovered only after a candidate got no votes in the precinct where she lived [pg26](#)
2. Georgia's voting system **failed to count 1,642 votes** in the 2020 Gwinnett County General Election and this was only detected because a Presidential hand count audit was ordered [pg23](#)
3. A 2022 U.S. Senate candidate **lost 21,586 votes in a four-minute span** on Election Night while both of his opponents' vote totals increased by 4,036 and 336 respectively. [pg26](#)
4. Logic and Accuracy testing **cannot detect malware-based fraud** because the malware can be programmed to count correctly during testing and not the election as shown above [pg50](#)

Illegitimate Certification

1. Georgia's voting system **does not have legitimate federal or state certifications** because it relies on hard coded passwords and unnecessarily exposes encryption keys in clear, plain text [pg35](#)
2. These vulnerabilities were **exploited** in a 2024 court demonstration to **change election results** on an authenticated copy of a Georgia election server in three minutes with six lines of code [pg33](#)
3. QR Code mismatch errors found in 63 of 65 Georgia counties in 2022 elections are the same errors that caused a Tennessee county **to decertify and remove their DDS 5.5 system** [pg35](#)



Audit Inadequacy

1. The inventor of the Risk Limiting Audit (RLA) process has explained many times to Georgia officials and in court the reasons why **RLA's cannot be used to audit BMD systems** [pg51](#)
2. A ballot image audit cannot prove the system counted correctly because **images can be altered before the audit is conducted**, thus only a hand count of paper ballots is a legitimate audit [pg51](#)
3. Gov. Kemp's study, based on VoterGA research, proved the 2020 hand count audit and machine recount had major discrepancies that **never confirmed original Presidential vote totals** [pg20](#)

Scan and Count Errors

1. The frequency of QR Code mismatch scanning errors found across Georgia counties in the 2024 General Election **exceeds maximum allowable federal standards** [pg28](#)
2. In the 2024 General Election, over **92,000 ballots were double scanned** before during and after certification for still largely unexplained reasons [pg51](#)
3. In the 2020 General Election, 3,930 ballots were double scanned **AND double counted** in the election results [pg20](#)

Remote Tampering

1. Georgia's current Canadian based voting system was **developed and maintained from Serbia** without the knowledge of Georgia voters or county election officials [pg31](#)
2. Georgia county **election servers were accessed remotely** during the 2020 General Election and 2021 Senate Runoff despite claims to the contrary and are still exposed to remote access [pg32](#)
3. Over **3,000 election program files were modified without detection** after a county server was installed thus voiding its certification [pg33](#)
4. A county election server was found to contain an **uncertified compiler** that allows a bad actor with remote access **to create and deploy malware to all county election equipment** [pg33](#)
5. The Secretary of State (SOS) has not addressed the vulnerabilities and **no one in the SOS office is responsible for cyber security** [pg33](#).

Legal Compliance Issues

1. A U.S. District Court found Georgia's current voting system **does not comply with state statutes for verifiability and elector readable choices** but it has been deployed for 6 years anyway [pg34](#)
2. The President of the United States ordered the Election Assistance Commission to **decertify all QR coded voting systems** in Executive Order 14248 signed on March 25, 2025 [pg35](#)
3. Georgia's voting system **cannot genuinely comply** with Help America Vote Act verifiability standards [pg34](#)

Georgia's current DDS 5.5A voting system has an established track record of these security issues most of which are **not detectable by election officials** during the normal course of conducting an election. For these reasons and many more, we believe **the risks of doing nothing for 2026**, as GAVREO and some election officials advocate, **far outweigh risks in efforts to secure 2026 elections**. In 2002, Georgia moved from disparate systems to paperless unverifiable Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting system in **exactly six months**. **We believe doing nothing for 2026 is not a legitimate option**. We need to hear specifically from you whether or not you support GAVREO positions and if so, **how you would address these security issues**. Thank you in advance for your reply.

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