Security Requirements for Georgia's Next Voting System



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JEESSC

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Common Security Concerns

Voters, GAVREO, VoterGA


Recommended Security Solutions

Ballot Printing
Ballot Marking
Vote Counting
Voter Authentication

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Systems Development Methodology Stages

1. Plan Project (Scope, Objectives)
2. Analyze Current System Problems
3. Define New System Requirements
4. Evaluate Alternatives
5. Specify New System



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Scope & Objectives

Scope Recommendation:
Establish separate project and scope to include GARVIS and poll book to GARVIS interface to address Salesforce synching, accuracy, performance and security issues

Security Objectives:

- Authentic Voters
- Authentic Ballots
- Authentic Counts

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Presentation Sources

- Forensic examinations
- Unrefuted expert witness testimony
- Court discovery
- Declassified intelligence
- Provable historical facts

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Georgia Voting System Evaluation Chronology

2001: **21st Century Voting System Commission**
I advocated for constitutional HMPB system (2/6/02 letter)

2002: Paperless DRE system implemented in exactly **6 months**

2018: **SAFE Commission**
My presentation advocated for BOD evaluation & against QR coded systems

2019: HB316 mandated BMD system, Democracy Suite 5.5A purchased
U.S. District Court found old DRE system constitutionally deficient

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25-Year Voting System History

Secretly counted elections

Secret proprietary software

Secretly preserved ballots (until 2024)

The Benchmark for 2028 Committee Success

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Who is the Customer?

Rasmussen Reports
@Rasmussen_Poll

"How concerned are you that electronic voting systems may allow votes to be changed remotely through internet connections during voting?"

I'm Concerned-
All Voters: 64%



"If a voter doesn't have confidence in whatever we are using …then we have failed"

R. Anglin, GAVREO

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Cybersecurity Top Concern

"Cybersecurity was ranked as the top concern for the members of the association who responded to our survey" *C. Channell, GAVREO*

"The current election equipment itself and any future election equipment …should be air gapped and not accessible to the internet"

Why is cybersecurity the top concern of voters, GAVREO & VoterGA if the SOS claims the voting system is not connected to the outside world?

Wireless access is internet connectivity that defeats air gapping

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Cybersecurity Mitigation

Eliminate Georgia's Single Point of Attack Exposure

Close Georgia's Remote Access Back Door

Prevent Unauthorized Modifications Revealed by Forensics

Defeat Attack Vectors Identified by Declassified Intelligence

Block Foreign Adversaries by Complying with U.S. Critical Infrastructure

Resolve Mitigation Deficiencies in Testing, Auditing & Certification

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Voter Authentication Solutions

- Eliminate unnecessary, unsecure, internet connectivity
- Assign voter customizable early voting poll location
- Store only county voter data on Election Day precinct pollbooks
- Batch update Early Voting and Election Day voter credit until secure, dedicated lines can be established

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Ballot Marking Solutions

Use hand marked paper ballots for non-ADA voters to:

- produces a **distinctly marked, auditable ballot** for each voter
- helps prevent and detect fraudulent duplication
- Provides original source of voter intent

Limit BMD ballots to ADA voters who need them because:

- there is **no mechanism to audit** what a BMD shows to the voter
- BMD ballots can be **easily duplicated** without detection

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Ballot on Demand Solutions

Preprint Ballot ID or Batch ID on each ballot for fraud prevention

Print serial number of printer on ballots for ballot fraud prevention

Direct connect pollbooks to printers to prevent bar code reuse fraud



Limit BOD printing to early voting to mitigate Election Day failure

- Backup ballot requirements are insufficient to mitigate BOD failure
- Many precincts have only 1-3 ballot styles & no need for Election Day BODs
- Counties can add precincts if necessary to reduce styles per precinct

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Counting Problems

Secrecy
Secret vote counts
Secret proprietary software
Struggles to obtain forensic examinations
Disputes over obscure election results

Cybersecurity Crisis
Breaches, back doors, attack vectors
Software & electronic record alterations
Foreign programmers & computer chips

Complexity
Unnecessarily complex operations
Election support consultant dependencies

Mitigation Defects
Illegitimate federal & state certifications
Inadequate Logic & Accuracy tests
Insufficient audit procedures
Election transparency obstructions

Excessive Costs
Expensive scanners, tabulators & servers
Costly hardware maintenance
Pricey software licensing

Logistical Burdens
Massive equipment storage facilities
Supply chain disruptions
Lengthy procurement process

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Hand Counting Solution

Publicly recorded counts help prevent fraud

2020 Presidential statewide recount took 3 days w/ 3 days notice

Verified hand counts methods can provide 100% real-time accuracy

Results can be complete before midnight if precincts have < 2000 voters

Use fresh, supervised, mostly volunteer teams arriving at 7pm

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Hand Count Benchmarks

8 races
1000 ballots
3 teams
4-person counting method
3 hrs. 15 min. - 3 hrs. 30 min. (method dependent)

Variables:

Count Method, #Ballots, #Races, #Teams, Time Constraints

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